This paper takes advantage of a newly-available survey to analyze the behavior of Global Value Chains (GVCs) in the aftermath of the Great Recession. The analysis exploits a rich availability of information to design a comprehensive taxonomy of GVC participation modes and explore their impact on firms' innovativeness and performance. Our findings highlight relevant heterogeneities in how GVC participants fared the crisis. While high-skill relational suppliers display a significant propensity to engage in innovative activities and R&D projects, other modes of GVC participation have no premium compared to domestic companies. This heterogeneity is also reflected in differential productivity and sales growth. Compared to the pre-crisis trends, we document a severe demand shock for low-skill and subordinated firms, while relational GVCs appear to be somewhat sheltered from the effects of the crisis.
Introduction
The nature of international trade has significantly changed over the past few decades. Globalization, the advent of IT, and the reduction in transportation costs have pushed firms to reorganize their activities with frequent strategies of outsourcing and off-shoring. As a result, the production of final goods has been increasingly fragmented into a large number of sequential stages coordinated in Global Value Chains (hereinafter GVCs).
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Whether a firms' involvement in a global production process fosters innovativeness and performance has critical implications for economic growth. Answering this question though may not be trivial in recent times of crisis. On the one hand, the literature on GVCs has emphasized the role of vertical specialization and interfirm relationships in amplifying knowledge exchanges and enhancing productivity. On the other, latest studies on the financial crisis highlighted some fragilities and identified GVCs as an important transmission channel of international downturns. Our paper explores this issue at the micro level by designing a comprehensive taxonomy of GVC participation modes, and analyzing heterogeneities in the firms' behavior and performance during the Great Recession.
The empirical framework of this study is the Italian economy between 2008 and 2013, which represents an interesting laboratory to provide new insights in this field of research. In fact, the Italian system is a suitable environment for value-chain participation: an industry characterized by a large number of small suppliers, with high division of labor, and frequent inter-firm connections. Furthermore, the time-span under investigation permits us to shed light on differential behaviors of GVCs in times of crisis. While previous studies emphasized the role of value-chain connections in the cross-country synchronization of adverse shocks (e.g., Baldwin, 2009) , we show significant heterogeneities in how different forms of GVCs fared the trade collapse. We mainly focus on the firms' choice to engage in knowledge-creating strategies, but we also analyze real performances and provide some evidence on the nature of the shock experienced by GVC participants after 2008.
There are several features of the analysis that are worth emphasizing. First, we take advantage of a newly available dataset which is truly representative of the industrial system as a whole. The database comes from 1 The concept of GVC comprises the full range of activities required to bring a product from its conception to its end use.
the widest survey administrated in a single European country -the MET survey on the Italian industry-and allows us to study even micro-sized companies with less than ten employees. These are typically excluded from previous works despite their prevalence (more than 90% in Italy) and the large benefits that they can gain from international linkages. We exploit the information in our dataset to outline a novel taxonomy of GVC participation modes that improves upon the use of aggregate data without relying on simplistic proxies.
Our classification identifies four main forms of GVC governance -based on a firm's capability and degree of subordination-and allows for disentangling the effect of value-chain involvement from export-driven factors.
Second, we jointly analyze behaviors and performances to provide a more accurate picture of the firms' activity in the aftermath of the Great Recession. In terms of the GVC literature, this can be thought of as a more comprehensive approach to explore the phenomenon of upgrading (i.e., the improvement of a firm's position along the value chain). Since the latter is unobservable, or at best difficult to measure, previous works typically made inference on the ex post variations in real outcomes.
2 Our analysis builds on this approach by taking an additional perspective into account; namely, while we still provide evidence on productivity and sales growth, we also focus on ex ante strategies aimed at increasing firm probability of upgrading. In particular, we study effects on extensive and intensive margins of innovation, R&D, and export activity, which we represent as channels of upgrading. We then interpret the combination of ex ante strategies and ex post performances as a more precise signal of a firm's advancement along the chain.
Moreover, we further contribute to the debate on the Great Recession by providing suggestive insights on the shock experienced by GVCs in times of crisis. Finally, we take advantage of the panel dimension of our dataset to control for the possible self selection of more dynamic companies into GVCs. The main empirical strategy employs random-effects models with Mundlak correction (inclusion of regressors' time averages), but we also implement fixed-effects estimators, two-step system-GMM, and matching techniques to further take care of critical econometric issues.
Our findings highlight relevant heterogeneities in how GVC participants fared the crisis. Although firms involved in GVCs display a higher average propensity to upgrade, the mere affiliation to a value chain is not sufficient for success after the 2009-trade collapse. The specific form of governance, comprising the whole 2 Morrison et al. (2008) point out some logical contradiction in previous approaches to the concept of upgrading.
system of relationships within a GVC, significantly affects firms' innovativeness and performance. Relational GVCs, involving skilled companies with low degrees of subordination, have a 4-to-6% higher probability of innovating and undertaking R&D projects. On the other hand, different forms of GVC participationnamely, arm-length, quasi-hierarchical, and hierarchical -have no significant premium in terms of innovative strategies. Interestingly, the involvement in GVCs also boosts the export probability of previously-noninternationalized companies.
The analysis of real performances provides consistent results. The greater upgrading propensity of relational GVCs is also reflected into their higher productivity (+6% in log scale) and sales growth (+9%), while other forms of governance are found, again, to have no advantage compared to domestic companies. In order to shed light on the shock experienced by GVCs in times of crisis we also perform a difference-in-differences
In particular, we analyze structural breaks in productivity and sales growth by exploiting the availability of a long panel for real outcomes and assuming pre-crisis stability of GVC participation. Even though this assumption is not negligible, we argue that the bias introduced in the model is likely to underestimate the actual magnitude of the shock (more on this issue in section 5.5).
While our results document a strong contraction of sales growth for GVCs (-9%), we do not detect any sign of productivity drop in the aftermath of the Great Recession. This combined evidence points at a severe demand shock induced by the crisis and is compatible with previous arguments on how GVC input-output linkages amplified fluctuations in the demand for final goods. Importantly, we show that the shock mostly affected low-skill and subordinated suppliers, while relational GVCs were somewhat sheltered from the negative impact of the crisis. Finally, our results are stable across a number of robustness tests controlling for possible endogeneity, simultaneity bias, self selection, and for firms' unobserved heterogeneity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature and a further discussion of the main contributions. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy and our taxonomy of GVC participation modes. Section 4 provides details on the dataset employed and descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows the results and section 6 concludes.
Related literature
Structure and performance of value chains are investigated from multiple viewpoints. A first strand of research provides theoretical foundation for the development of GVCs by focusing on vertical specialization and fragmentation of the production processes: e.g., Findlay (1978) , Dixit and Grossman (1982) , and more recently Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) , Markusen and Venables (2007) , Antràs and Chor, 2013, Costinot et al. (2013) , and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2014) .
A different perspective is offered by the GVC approach (e.g., Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994 , Gereffi, 1999 , and Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002 and the vast body of papers exploring the nature of inter-firm organizations within the value chains (e.g., Sturgeon et al., 2008 , Navas-Alemán, 2011 . Their common view is that complex international relationships generate flows of managerial expertise and technical knowledge which in turn may stimulate the improvement of a firm's position along the GVC (i.e., upgrading). The concept of governance 3 is considered to play a central role in affecting the growth prospects of the companies involved. While all value chain relationships imply some degree of information transmission, the extent to which knowledge is created, transferred, and adopted may vary considerably across modes of participation in the global production process (Kaplinsky, 2004; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011) . In this regard, Gereffi et al. (2005) points at three key determinants of the GVC governance patterns: (i) the complexity of the transaction; (ii) the possibility to codify information; and (iii) the capability of the suppliers along the chain. Their interactions characterize different forms of governance and explain relevant heterogeneities in the learning opportunities of GVC participants. In particular, relational GVCs, comprising complex transactions and high-skill suppliers, are considered to offer the ideal conditions for the development of upgrading processes (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002 ; see section 3.2 for a detailed discussion). 4 Altogether, the GVC approach provides a complementary perspective to the view of knowledge transfer given by the international production literature: the growth opportunities of a firm are not only affected by its choice on whether or not to be internationalized, but also, and especially, by its specific way of participating in the 3 The term governance refers to the "authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain" (Gereffi, 1994) .
4 A collateral strand of the GVC literature specifically explores the link among forms of governance, upgrading, and learning mechanisms (see for instance, Schmitz, 2004 , Bazan and Navas-Alemán, 2004 , and Giuliani et al., 2005 . global production process.
Despite the large number of works examining GVCs on a theoretical basis, the empirical evidence at the micro level is still underwhelming. The vast majority of papers focus on case studies or limit the analysis to specific industries (Gereffi, 1999 , Schmitz, 1999 , Sturgeon, 2002 , among many others), while only a few examples exploit plant-level data. Within this strand of the literature, Pietrobelli and Saliola (2008) focus on Thailand to document how the buyer involvement with local suppliers affects productivity, technology diffusion, and output growth. Similarly, Saliola and Zanfei (2009) find that knowledge-intense relationships are positively associated with the presence of global buyers in the market. Finally, Baldwin and Yan (2014) examine whether the integration of Canadian companies into GVCs fosters productivity growth.
The literature on the Italian system is rich, but mainly related to outsourcing, off-shoring, or export.
Among these studies, Chiarvesio et al. (2010) focus on internationalization and innovation strategies of SMEs operating in industrial districts, while Accetturo et al. (2011) (2011) and Accetturo and Giunta (2015) explore heterogeneities across the firms' position in a value chain.
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This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we take advantage of a newlyavailable dataset containing relevant information on the involvement in GVC of a large sample of Italian 5 Also on the recent crisis, Escaith et al. (2010) show the higher elasticity to international trade of companies in GVCs, while Boehm et al. (2014) focus on the role of multinational firms in the cross-country transmission of adverse shocks.
SMEs. Our data allow us to improve upon analyses on clusters or sectors, as well as to propose a more rigorous approach for the identification of value chains at the micro level. Previous works either assumed that GVCs are an economy-wide phenomenon, or exploited the firms' exporting status as a simple proxy.
Instead, we rely on a rich availability of information to design a comprehensive taxonomy of GVCs and of their participation modes. Moreover, the focus on industrialized countries permits us to analyze the role of knowledge-intense relationships which was largely unexplored by previous works on least developed economies (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Giuliani et al., 2005) .
Second, we deal with the unobservability of the upgrading process by adding an additional perspective.
Existent literature typically deduces upgrading from measures of performance, as they are positively affected by the improvement of a firm's position along the chain. While we still provide evidence on ex post productivity and sales growth, we also focus on the adoption of ex ante strategies aimed at increasing the likelihood of upgrading: extensive and intensive margins of innovation, R&D, and export. As far as we know, this is the only work exploring the effect of GVCs on the firms' propensity to engage in knowledge-creating activities.
Moreover, we contribute to the debate on the Great Recession by focusing on the 2008-2013 period and presenting some insights on the nature of the shock experienced by GVCs in the aftermath of the trade collapse. Importantly, we add a new element to this literature by showing relevant heterogeneities in how GVC participants fared the recent crisis. Finally, this is the first paper exploiting panel techniques to deal with critical econometric issues in the GVC approach.
Empirical methodology
This section presents the empirical strategy of the paper. First, we describe our approach in identifying GVCs and their different forms of governance. Then, we illustrate the econometric methodology employed to control for endogeneity, self selection, and firms' unobserved heterogeneity.
Identification of GVCs
The few empirical papers dealing with micro data typically employed export activity as a simple indicator of participation in a value chain. The aim of this work is to propose a more exhaustive measure that acknowledges the complexity of this phenomenon and possibly improves upon the traditionally used proxies.
Our approach combines survey data on export, import, type of the main good produced, and participation in global networks, to identify the firms which are most likely to be involved in GVCs.
Because intermediate products are typically employed in a broader production process, we regard exporters of semi-finished goods to be (reasonably) part of a GVC.
6 Similarly, a company importing its inputs and exporting final goods is totally integrated in an international framework and is expected to participate in a production on global scale. A certain degree of ambiguity arises when companies are, to some extent, internationalized; either import input factors or export final products. For this group, a firm's inclusion in our GVC proxy is conditioned on its involvement in global networks, as captured by the existence of "longlasting and significant relationships with foreign companies". 7, 8 Although this definition is not based on an objective scale, it leaves to the firm the evaluation of whether the international linkage is non-occasional and represents an important activity for its own business. This piece of information allows to rule out from our GVC measure firms that occasionally search for new markets and cheaper inputs (roughly 75% of the ambiguous cases). 9 However, we also test alternative definitions of GVCs excluding partially-internationalized companies (and thus precluding global networks to play any role) or adopting conservative thresholds for firm export activity (20% or 40% of total sales).
10 Results are largely in line with the ones presented in section 5.
Modes of participation in GVCs
Theoretical literature suggests that the learning opportunities of a firm may vary significantly across its possible modes of participation in a GVC. To explore this heterogeneity we propose a classification of the 6 Note that the use of survey measures -i.e., firms' self-assessments-solves potential problems linked to the ex post classification into different types of goods (tires, for instance, can be either intermediate, final products, or both). Self-declarations on the main activity permit us to avoid judgment calls and to exclusively rely on a firm's own perception about the main destination of its product.
7 The questionnaire specifically asks for the existence of "significant and long-lasting relationships with foreign companies" as well as their scopes (trade, commercialization, common R&D projects, etc.) . To the purpose of this section we only exploit aggregate information, while we employ data on the scope of the relationships for the definition of the different GVC participation modes (section 3.2).
8 It is worth stressing that this measure does not uniquely identify GVCs. Fully-internationalized firms and exporters of intermediate goods are considered to be part of a value chain even without any long-term connection with foreign companies. This is crucial for the identification of arm-length suppliers, largely emphasized by the literature on GVCs (e.g., Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Gereffi et al., 2005) . See section 3.2 for a detailed discussion.
9 This classification is only feasible for manufacturing firms. Companies in the service sectors are defined to be part of a GVC if they are internationalized and declare to have long lasting and significant relationships with foreign firms. Results are robust to the exclusion of service sectors from the sample.
10 Throughout the paper we only rely on a dummy variable and do not impose any lower bound to identify exporters. different forms of governance based upon the capability of suppliers and the strength of power relationships in a chain.
The first dimension has crucial implications for the learning prospects of a company. In fact, firms in GVCs need some skills not only to handle the expertise they already have, but also to access external sources of knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) . Moreover, multinational companies are more willing to transfer knowledge to skilled partners to reduce the risk of residual incompatibilities between the product design and the components manufactured (Puga and Trefler, 2010) . Finally, higher capabilities also imply a certain degree of autonomy creating incentives for efficiency gains, accumulation of technical skills, and investments in creative activities.
In addition to the firms' own skill, the existence of power relationships can strongly affect the coordination mechanism within a GVC and the growth opportunities of its participants. Indeed, under the (legitimate or implicit) authority which is used to coordinate the division of labor, knowledge is typically treated as a scarce resource and concentrated in specialized functional units at the highest levels of the value chain. As a result, narrowly-specialized (subordinated) suppliers, with low technological know-how and no incentives for the transmission of innovative ideas upwards, are more likely to display low productivity gains and poor innovative attitudes.
Our taxonomy proxies firm capability and the degree of subordination with data on the affiliation to corporate groups, the existence of "long-lasting and significant relationships for trade purposes", and the degree of participation in the conception of the final product. The combination of this information allows us to identify four forms of GVC governance (in the spirit of Schmitz, 2002 and Gereffi et al., 2005) according to the following scheme:
1. Arm-length: suppliers participating in GVCs without any long-lasting and significant relationship for trade purposes. 11 This is the most market-like form of GVCs, implying negligible dependence between buyers and suppliers and involving transactions that are highly codifiable (standard or easily customized goods).
2. Hierarchical : subsidiaries of corporate groups. The degree of subordination is at the maximum level since they are typically managerially controlled by a parent company (which is often the leader of the chain).
12,13
3. Quasi-hierarchical : companies having long-lasting and significant relationships for trade purposes and no involvement in the conception of the final product. 14 Even without any formal control by a lead firm, quasi-hierarchical suppliers are strongly dependent on buyers providing detailed specifications for goods and production processes. In this regard, the existence of relevant commercial networks proxies for their strong dependence and subordination, while the absence of participation in the definition of the final product captures their low capability and marginal involvement in the decision process at the GVC level.
4. Relational : firms with long-lasting and significant trade-relationships and relevant involvement in the conception of the final product. 15 These companies engage in close inter-firm connections, but their capability ensures greater autonomy compared to quasi-hierarchical relationships. Differently from the previous form of governance, the active participation in the conception of the final product captures high capability of the supplier and its relevant involvement in the decision process within the GVC.
We regard these modes of participation to display heterogeneous behaviors and performances in times of crisis.
First of all, we expect no significant role for hierarchical and quasi-hierarchical GVCs in which the existence of power relationships (together with the involvement of low-skill firms in the second mode) inhibits a companies' incentives to upgrade. On the other hand, relational GVCs combining low subordination and high suppliers' capability should provide the ideal environment for the development of upgrading strategies aimed at counteracting any negative shock induced by the Great Recession. Finally, we have mixed priors on arm-12 To derive this piece of data we match information on the affiliation to corporate groups with a dummy variable for parent companies (imposed equal to zero).
13 In this regard, the international business literature emphasizes relevant differences in the possible forms of subsidiary mandates (see for instance the distinction between competence-creating vs. competence-exploiting subsidiaries -Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005-or asset-exploiting vs. asset-seeking activities -Le Bas and Sierra, 2002; Narula and Zanfei, 2005) .
14 Firms' involvement in the conception of the final product comes from the following question in the MET survey: "to what extent does your firm participate in the conception and definition of the final product for the market?". The survey allows answers on a scale from zero to four. Throughout the core of the paper, quasi-hierarchical suppliers are required to have no participation (0), but we also test alternative thresholds (1 or 2) with no significant changes in the results.
15 Throughout the paper we simply require a positive threshold for a firm's involvement in the conception of the final product. However, we also test the robustness of our results to the adoption of alternative thresholds (greater than 1 or 2), or to different proxies of a firm's capability (share of graduated employees). For a detailed list of robustness checks see section 5.6. length GVCs in which the absence of close connections implies a high degree of autonomy (that stimulates upgrading), but also limits the exchange of knowledge flows with partner firms. Moreover, occasional trade relationships are the most likely to be cut down when a negative shock occurs, thus exposing arm-length suppliers to higher demand fluctuations in times of crisis.
Econometric approach
The econometric analysis employs the taxonomy outlined in the previous sections to study the behavior of GVC participants during the Great Recession. In order to provide a detailed picture of the firms' activities and growth prospects, we focus on a broad array of knowledge-creating strategies as well as real outcomes between 2008 and 2013. In terms of the value-chain literature, this joint focus on strategies and performance can be thought of as a comprehensive approach to overcome the unobservability of upgrading. First, we analyze firm propensity to engage in activities that are likely to increase the probability of upgrading (i.e., channels of upgrading). Then, we explore heterogeneities in ex post performances -productivity and sales growth-which are positively affected by the improvement of a firm's position along the chain.
The baseline equation tests the effect of GVC participation on the extensive margins of innovation, R&D, and export according to the following specification:
where Y it is the dummy dependent variable -Innovation, R&D, or Export-and V C it−1 is a vector of covariates measuring either the beginning-of-period value-chain participation (GV C it−1 ), or the specific form of GVC governance (Arm-length it−1 , Quasi-hierarchy it−1 , Hierarchy it−1 , and Relational it−1 ). Equation (1) is a standard reduced form including a rich set of covariates (X it−1 ) to capture structural characteristics (size, age, sales, cash flow, market share, vertical integration, productivity) and behaviors (affiliation to networks or groups of firms, human capital, and R&D), as well as firm degree of internationalization aimed at purging export-driven factors. 17 We also include time effects (λ t ) and controls for the firms' belonging 16 Notice that, although innovation and R&D are closely-related activities, they do not display a perfect correspondence when innovation without R&D is a widespread strategy. This is especially the case in economies dominated by SMEs such as the Italian system (Gottardi, 1996) . 17 To mitigate endogeneity issues all covariates are lagged once. However, we also propose specifications with further lags (L2 industry (12), region (20), or geographical province (110) (Γ i ) to capture common shocks that are time varying and permanent industrial/geographical effects. Finally, c i is a factor controlling for firms' unobserved heterogeneity.
There are two main issues we need to take into account for assessing the effect of GVC participation on the firms' propensity to upgrade. The first one has to do with reverse causality, whereby GVCs do not foster upgrading processes but instead result from successful innovations and better performances. The second interrelated point is the possible self selection of more dynamic companies into GVCs. Because the adoption of external instruments is hardly feasible in our framework, we try address these issues in several alternative ways.
First of all, we alleviate problems of reverse causality by ruling out simultaneity bias. Matching current upgrading with lagged GVC involvement partially solves reverse causation but may leave residual endogeneity in case of relevant unobserved heterogeneity or high persistence of Y and V C. Dealing with unobserved heterogeneity in a binary-response framework is not trivial. On the one hand, standard random-effects (RE) models impose unrealistic assumptions on the type of heterogeneity that takes place (i.e., c i must be uncorrelated with the entire set of regressors).
18 On the other, fixed-effects models (that do not impose any hypothesis on c i ) are computationally difficult and introduce an incidental parameter problem leading to inconsistent estimates. Our strategy is in-between the two approaches and relies on RE-probit models augmented with the time average of each regressor (i.e., Mundlak-type controls). In this way, we relax the assumption of independence between c i and the set of covariates, and estimate the effect of each variable in terms of deviations from its time average. 19 Moreover, to further control for persistence of Y it , we always provide results also for the subset of firms with Y it−1 = 0. This is particularly important when analyzing for survey measures and L3 for balance-sheet variables) with unchanged results. A detailed definition of the variables employed is provided in Appendix.
18 Let ε it be the error term and Z be the full set of covariates (composed of V C it−1 and X it−1 ). Pure RE models impose the strong hypothesis of independence between c i and the Z it (i.e., E[
19 Our estimator follows Wooldridge (2010) and can be viewed as a Mundlak version of the Chamberlain's assumption on the correlation between c i and Z i.e., c i |Z ∼ N (ψ +z i , σ 2 a ) . Notice that this approach is equivalent to a fixed effects model in which the heterogeneity is projected on the time-mean of the regressors (Z i ), allowing to write the latent variable as Y * it = ψ + β Z it−1 + θ Z i + e it , with e it ∼ N (0, 1). As usual, the estimator hinges crucially on the strict exogeneity of Z it−1 conditional on c i . We verify this hypothesis by adding the vector Z it to our specification and testing the significance of its estimates (as proposed by Wooldridge, 2010) . The test never rejects the null (for any of the additional regressors), thus providing at least some justification for the strict exogeneity assumption.
firms' international propensity.
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In the unlikely case that residual heterogeneity is still affecting our findings, we also implement some alternative estimators allowing for the introduction of firm fixed effects. In section 5.3 we show the robustness of our results to the adoption of conditional logistic and linear probability (within estimators) models purging all the firms' (observable and unobservable) characteristics that are stable over time. Finally, we further take care of self selection by employing matching techniques (Coarsened Exact Matching) to recover a subsample of companies with the same ex ante probability of GVC participation. We then re-estimate our baseline specification for the new subsample of balanced firms to make inference on the treatment effect and provide additional robustness to our results.
The last econometric issue that is worth discussing is the possibility of correlated shocks. In other words, if there is a polarization of GVCs within specific industries or geographical areas, the set of parameters α may be affected by the firms' reaction to unobserved shocks and no longer reflect the impact of GVC participation.
21 To tackle this concern we enrich our baseline specifications with an extensive set of time fixed effects specific for firm belonging industry (12 macro-industries × 3 periods), region (20 × 3), and geographical province (110 × 3). 22 This broad set of fixed effects permits us to control for most of the unobserved shocks induced by the Great Recession.
Further analyses are largely in line with the baseline specification. We take advantage of RE-tobit models (with Mundlak correction) for the intensive margins of innovation, R&D, or export and within estimators (with firm and time fixed effects) for performance variables. We also exploit a long panel of real outcomes to provide some insights on the shock experienced by GVCs during the Great Recession. In particular, we project our GVC proxies backwards (assuming stability over missing years) to employ diff-in-diff techniques and analyze structural breaks in productivity and sales growth around 2008 (more on this in section 5.5).
20 Indeed, a positive association between GVCs and export status is intrinsic in the definitions of section 3.1 and 3.2. To rule out this spurious correlation, results on export premia are only reported for the subset of non-internationalized firms in t − 1.
21 This is the case if the crisis produced differential effects across industries and regions. 22 It is worth noticing that this approach, together with the inclusion of firm-specific fixed effects, allows to purge the model from the possible omitted-variable bias induced by the absence of information on multi-product firms. On the one hand, any association between these companies and the set of dependent variables -as well as any stable mismeasurement of the GVC proxies-is captured by the firm fixed effects. On the other, if multi-product firms are more concentrated in certain industries or (northern) geographical regions, the set of interacted time effects should control for a large fraction of the residual time-varying component.
Data
The main source of data is the MET database on Italian firms, the widest survey administrated in a single European country. The original sample of the four waves -2008, 2009, 2011, and 2013 -is composed of 25,000 cross-sectional observations and follows a disproportionate Bayesian scheme representative at the size, geographical region, and industry levels (see Table 1 for some details).
23 Differently from other datasets, the sample provides information on every size class -even micro-sized companies with less than ten employeesand refers to both manufacturing (60%) and service industries (40%). Its rich array of data is exploited for our taxonomy of GVC participation modes and for controls in the main specification.
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The survey also contains relevant information on export, R&D projects, and product/process innovations. 25 In addition to dichotomous answers, the questionnaire asks for firm expenditure in R&D (as a share of total sales) and for the share of income coming from exported goods, from products that are "new to the market" (radical product innovations) or "only new to the firm" (imitative products). While our analysis largely relies on the first type of information -we do not impose any threshold for R&D and Export-, we also exploit quantitative data for the intensive margins and some robustness checks.
Survey data are then matched with balance sheet information from Cribis D&B. The final estimation sample ranges from 30,000 to 10,000 observations, depending on the specification. Our econometric strategy hinges on the application of several selection-filters inducing a relevant contraction in the sample size. The major loss comes from the focus on the panel fraction of companies with complete balance-sheet information. 26 In addition, some observations are dropped because of unreasonable values (negative or nil assets, negative or nil sales) or to reduce the influence of outliers (balance sheet variables are censored at the 1%).
23 The large number of interviews follows a scheme representative at the size-region-industry stratum which allows for an oversampling of medium-sized and large firms (a relatively rare phenomenon accounting for roughly 0.50% of the population). We purge potential distortions with the introduction of controls for a firm's size (log-number of employees or log of total assets) as well as firm-specific (conditional or unconditional) fixed effects. Moreover, we do not detect any sizable difference in our results if we employ (in a pooled framework) sampling weights designed to reproduce the population aggregates. 24 We exploit information on import, type of the main good produced, corporate groups, global networks, and involvement in the conception of the final product for our proxies of GVC participation, while data on size, age, and human capital are employed as control variables in equation 1. 25 The definitions in the questionnaire are in line with the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) and follow the guidelines provided by OECD and Eurostat (Frascati Manual for R&D and Oslo Manual for innovation).
26 Balance sheet data are not available for family firms, a relevant fraction of the overall sample. This constraint, combined with the need of longitudinal data, induces a sample reduction of about 60%. Notes: composition of the sample by firm size class (number of employees), geographical macro-region, and industrial macrosector (high-tech sectors are: chemicals, plastic, means of transportation, engineering, electric and electronic equipment). The original sample is mainly stratified along 12 industries (see Table 3 ), 20 regions, and four size classes. The large amount of interviews is compatible with an oversampling of larger, more innovative, firms in the manufacturing sector, and of companies in certain geographical regions. The sampling scheme is performed with Bayesian models exploiting the observed frequencies of the previous waves. The survey is administrated via phone calls or via web with the assistance of a phone operator. The actual administration follows a preselection of the most suitable answerer. In the case of incoherent answers along the survey, firms are interviewed a second time as an additional control of validity. For further details about the sampling scheme, the administration methods, and the control procedures see Brancati (2012) . are in relational value chains, while arm-length, quasi-hierarchical, and hierarchical relationships are 30%, 29%, and 14%, respectively. They also display quite a heterogeneous distribution across industries, with a prominent concentration in the chemical, electronic, engineering, transportation, and textile sectors (Table   3) . Table 4 reports conditional statistics for innovation and R&D. Firms belonging to GVCs display a higher propensity to engage in knowledge-creating activities, with shares of dynamic companies that are two-to-four times larger than non-GVC firms. This phenomenon is strongly heterogeneous across forms of governance and is mainly driven by the higher dynamism of relational suppliers. The aim of the next section is to assess whether behind this positive association there is a causal nexus linking GVC participation and firm upgrading propensity in times of crisis.
Descriptive statistics

Results
This section presents the results of the paper. First, we analyze the effect of GVC participation on the firms' probability to engage in innovation, R&D, and export activities which are aimed at promoting upgrading processes. Then, we explore heterogeneities by GVC forms of governance and discuss the results Notes: participation in GVC and forms of governance by industrial sector.
for the intensive margins. Finally, we test the effects on ex post performance -productivity and sales growthand explore structural breaks in the aftermath of the 2009-trade collapse. Notes: percentage of innovative firms (column 1) and companies with R&D projects (column 2) by GVC participation modes.
GVC participation and channels of upgrading
Column 1 of Table 5 presents the results for firms' innovativeness. On the top of structural characteristics and behaviors, GVC participation is found to induce a 4.1%-increase in a company's probability of introducing (at least one) product or process innovations. 27 Because Mundlak-type regressors net out persistent heterogeneity (including the higher average innovativeness of GVCs, µ(GVC)), this estimate can be interpreted as the innovation-premium generated by a firm's decision to start operating in the GVC.
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The effect is even higher (6.6%) if we focus on the subsample of non-innovative companies in t − 1 to address the possible reverse causality driven by the persistence of the innovation process (column 3). The other controls present coefficients that are in line with a priori expectations, with a predominant role played by firm structural characteristics (especially size), R&D, and degree of internationalization.
Column 2 of Table 5 presents coherent results for the extensive margins of R&D. Firms involved in GVCs show greater dynamic propensities, translating into a probability of undertaking R&D projects that is 3.1%-higher than other companies; 6.9% in the subsample of firms with no R&D expenditure in t − 1 (column 4). Once again, the effect of GVC participation dominates the positive impact of internationalization and survives to our rich set of controls.
Finally, column 5 presents some evidence on the firms' probability of exporting. Since our proxy is by construction correlated with the dependent variable, we only focus on the subset of previously noninternationalized companies (10% in GVCs). Our results show that domestic firms participating in GVCs 27 We do not find significant heterogeneities if we distinguish between the type of innovation introduced. 28 Notice that the significance of most of the regressor means (also those that are not showed in the table) implicitly validates our need of relaxing the orthogonality conditions of standard RE-probit models.
are characterized by a 18.6%-higher probability to start exporting in time t. This evidence may be related to the role of knowledge acquisition from partners along the chain in the reduction of informational barriers to international trade. Notes: RE-probit models with Mundlak correction (marginal effects). The dependent variable is listed in the second row (Innovation, R&D, and Export in column 1-3, 2-4, and 5, respectively). The left panel reports the estimates for the entire sample, while the right panel refers to subset of firms with Y t−1 = 0. µ(ρ) refers to the time average of ρ. Additional covariates in the estimations (not shown): time average of the other regressors. All measures are defined in Appendix. *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Robust standard errors in brackets.
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Heterogeneity by GVC forms of governance
Theoretical literature suggests that the coordination mechanism within a GVC and the learning opportunities of its participants vary considerably across forms of governance. We argue that this heterogeneity may even be exacerbated in times of crisis because the firms' specific skills and environment may also affect the capacity of reaction to unexpected downturns. In particular, we regard relational GVCs, combining low degrees of subordination and high capabilities, to provide the ideal conditions for the development of upgrading strategies aimed at counteracting negative shocks. We empirically test this statement by enriching our baseline specifications with the definitions of governance outlined in section 3.2. Table 6 presents the results. Column 1 clearly shows an effect of GVC participation on innovation that is highly heterogeneous, translating into a substantial innovative premium for relational GVCs and no significant impact for the other forms of governance. Again, this effect dominates our rich set of controls and is larger for the subsample of previously-non-innovative companies (5.9% in column 3). Column 2 shows consistent results for the investment in R&D: relational GVCs have a 3.7%-higher probability of investing in research activities (5.5% in column 4) while other modes of participation do not display any significant premium compared to domestic companies.
A somewhat different picture emerges from the firms' probability of exporting (column 5), whereby the impact of GVCs is found to be more homogeneous across forms of governance. However, the magnitude of the coefficients suggests that close informal relationships (in quasi-hierarchical and relational GVCs) may have a central role in the acquisition of information from partners along the chain. This, in turn, reduces the sunk costs associated to the penetration into foreign markets and results into a higher probability of export.
Unrestricted unobserved heterogeneity
The estimator employed so far controls for firm unobserved heterogeneity by conditioning c i on the full set of regressors' means. We further take care of unobservable factors with alternative econometric approaches accounting for the inclusion of firm fixed effects and allowing us to avoid any restriction on the type of heterogeneity that takes place. Table 7 shows the results of linear probability (odd columns) and fixed-effects logit models (even columns).
The coefficients are qualitatively in line with our previous findings suggesting they are not driven by residual Notes: RE-probit models with Mundlak correction (marginal effects). The dependent variable is listed in the second row (Innovation, R&D, and Export in column 1-3, 2-4, and 5, respectively). The left panel reports the estimates for the entire sample, while the right panel refers to subset of firms with Y t−1 = 0. µ(ρ) refers to the time average of ρ. Additional covariates in the estimations (not shown) follow the specification in Table 5 . *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Robust standard errors in brackets.
unobserved heterogeneity. 30 Furthermore, we obtain similar results when implementing two-step system-GMM estimators on a synthetic (continuous) measure of firm innovativeness (see the robustness checks in section 5.6).
Intensive margins
This section explores the effect of GVC participation on the intensive margins of innovation, R&D, and export. We proxy the firms' innovativeness with two alternative measures: the share of sales from products that are new to the market -capturing the weight of radical product innovations (%Prod P )-and from goods that are only new to the company -including softer forms like imitative products (%Prod S ). 31 Similarly, we measure R&D intensity with the firms' expenditure in R&D (as a share of total sales, %R&D) and export intensity as the share of sales from exported products (%Exp). Table 7 also shows the lower propensity of quasi-hierarchical GVCs in investing in R&D projects. 31 These measures reflect a firm's own perception on the innovativeness embedded in its new products. Differently from previous results we are now excluding process innovations whose intensive margins are difficult to proxy. Notes: linear probability (column 1, 3, and 5) and conditional logistic models (column 2, 4, and 6) with time and firm fixed effects (coefficients). The dependent variable is listed in the top row (Innovation, R&D, and Export in column 1-3, 2-4, and 5-6, respectively). Additional covariates in the estimations (not shown) follow the specification in Table 5 (excluding Munldak-type regressors). *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Standard errors in brackets (robust in column 1, 3, and 5).
participation, especially in the relational form, has a relevant impact also on the magnitude of the innovation undertaken. Importantly, the effect is stronger for the introduction of truly innovative products (column 1 and 5) than for softer innovations such as imitative goods (column 2 and 6). Again, we find similar results for R&D (column 3 and 7) and a more homogeneous effect for the share of export (column 4 and 8).
Performance
Having established the effect of GVC participation on the firms' strategic behavior, we now turn the attention on their productivity and sales growth. This additional focus can be viewed as a complementary perspective to our analysis of ex ante activities and allows us to provide some insights on the shock experienced by GVCs in the aftermath of the Great Recession. While, due to data limitations, we are not able to study the behavior of GVCs in normal times, the availability of a long panel for real outcomes offers the chance to perform a diff-in-diff exercise around the crisis. We do so by exploiting balance-sheet data from 2004 to 2013 and projecting backwards the 2008-values of our GVC proxies, thus assuming stability over missing years. We then employ within estimators (with firm and time fixed effects) and interaction terms with pre-crisis (τ = 2004-2008) and crisis (τ = 2009-2013) dummies (1I(τ ) ) to analyze structural breaks Notes: RE-tobit models withMundlak correction. The dependent variable is listed in the second row (%Prod P, %Prod S, %R&D, and %Exp in column 1-5, 2-6, 3-7, and 4-8, respectively). The left panel reports the estimates for the entire sample, while the right panel refers to subset of firms with Y t−1 = 0. µ(ρ) refers to the time average of ρ. Additional covariates in the estimations (not shown) follow the specifications of Innovation (for column 1, 2, 5, 6), R&D (for column 3, 7), and Export (for column 4, 8) of Table 5 . All measures are defined in Appendix. *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Robust standard errors in brackets.
between the two periods.
32
Before showing the results, it is worth discussing the measurement error and the bias induced by our assumption of GVC pre-crisis stability. While we correctly identify firms in times of crisis, the backward projection of their status implies a mismeasurement of companies exiting or entering into a GVC before 2008. We regard the first type of error to be relatively negligible because internationalized firms are unlikely to withdraw from foreign markets in times of low domestic demand. 33 Indeed, 2011-census data on Italian firms show a 5%-increase in the overall number of exporters, with a marginal share of companies exiting international markets within the same period. 34 Thus, if any measurement error occurs, it should mainly concern firms with a delayed entrance into GVCs. 35 If this is the case, the productivity-gap between inter-
Y it is either productivity or sales growth, c i is the firm-specific fixed effect, and 1I(pre-crisis) and 1I(crisis) are dummy variables identifying the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and crisis (2009-2013) nationalized and non-internationalized companies (largely emphasized by Melitz, 2003, Bernard et al., 2003, and many others) 36 should ensure a downward bias for the pre-crisis estimates of GVC participation. In fact, our proxies for GVCs before 2008 are grouping together highly productive companies (actually) involved in GVCs, with relatively less productive firms who engaged in international linkages only at a later time. As a result, any negative structural break on productivity and sales growth across periods may be interpreted as a lower bound for the actual shock. Table 9 presents the results. In the two sub-periods, GVCs displayed a significant productivity premium on aggregate, but mainly confined to relational forms of governance (column 1 and 2). 37 These findings support our previous results and confirm the crucial role played by firm capacity in affecting upgrading along a GVC. Interestingly, the comparison of pre-and post-crisis coefficients does not highlight any significant productivity shock across time.
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The dynamic of sales growth draws a rather different picture. While the effect of relational GVCs is again positive and significant in both periods, other forms of governance experienced strong contractions compared to their pre-crisis trends. On average, the sales growth of firms in GVCs dropped by 9.2 percentage points notching down their positive premium in normal times. This combined evidence is compatible with a strong demand shock for firms involved in GVCs and with previous arguments on the role of global networks in the transmission of the crisis (Baldwin, 2009) . Importantly, the shock was highly non-homogeneous, being more severe for low-skill firms (quasi-hierarchical) and for companies engaging in occasional relationships (arm length). Conversely, relational suppliers appeared to be somewhat sheltered from the negative effects of the crisis.
Additional robustness
To test the validity of the results we run a number of additional robustness checks, mainly aimed at addressing reverse causality, self selection, and the possibility of unobserved shocks:
See also Clerides et al. (1998) , Bernard and Jensen (1999) , Delgado et al. (2002) , Yeaple (2005) , Van Biesebroeck (2005), Castellani and Zanfei (2007) , Fabling and Sanderson (2013) , among many others.
37 Results are qualitatively similar (albeit not always significant) if we employ TFP (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) in place of value added per worker. 38 The change in the magnitude of the coefficient (-1.14%) is not significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.651). 39 Results of all the robustness checks are available upon request. Notes: within estimators with firm and time fixed effects. The dependent variable is listed in the first row (∆Log-productivity and ∆Log-sales in column 1-2 and 3-4, respectively). The effect of GVC and GVC forms of governance is allowed to vary in times of crisis (overall coefficient reported). 1I(τ ) is a dummy variable identifying the sub-period τ (listed in the second row). Pre-crisis and crisis periods refer to 2004-2008 and 2009-2013, respectively . Additional covariates in the estimations (not shown) follow the specification in column 2 of Table 5 (excluding Munldak-type regressors). All measures are defined in Appendix. *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Robust standard errors in brackets.
• we employ a mixed strategy relying on matching techniques to further explore the issue of self selection.
First we exploit Coarsened Exact Matching models (Iacus et al., 2011) to select a subsample of firms with the same ex ante probability of GVC participation (the treatment variable). 40 Then, we repeat the analyses of section 5 on the new balanced sample;
• we test alternative definitions of GVCs based on more conservative thresholds for firm export activity (20% or 40% of firm total sales), for the involvement in the conception of the final product, and different proxies for firm capability (median and 75 th percentile of the share of graduated employees);
• we adopt minimum thresholds for the extensive margins of R&D and export (5%-10% and 20% of sales, respectively);
• we include time effects that are specific for the firms' belonging industry (12×3), region (20×3), and province (110×3) to control for unobservable correlated shocks;
• we implement multivariate probit models (with Mundlak correction) to control for third party factors affecting firm innovativeness, R&D propensity, and export status. This approach accounts for the simultaneity of the phenomena allowing for a correlation across error terms;
• we exclude from the estimation sample the service sector and adopt alternative clustering of the standard errors (industry, region -with bootstrapping-, or province, as well as two-way clustering at the industry-region and firm-industry levels);
• we employ within estimators and two-step system-GMM models on a synthetic measure of firms'
innovativeness (the first principal component of R&D and innovation);
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• we enrich the matrix X it−1 with further lags for the control variables (t − 2, or t − 3), dummies for the legal form of the company, for firms' productivity (log-value added per worker, or TFP as computed by Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) , and financial status (leverage and composition of funding).
In all cases results are largely unchanged.
Concluding remarks
This paper takes advantage of a newly-available survey to explore strategies and performance of GVCs in the aftermath of the Great Recession. The analysis exploits a rich set of information on Italian SMEs to design a comprehensive taxonomy of the possible GVC participation modes and overcome some limitations of the previously-used proxies. The empirical strategy employs our classification to investigate the firms' innovativeness, productivity, and sales growth between 2008 and 2013.
Our results highlight relevant heterogeneities in how GVC participants fared the recent crisis. Although the involvement in a GVC has a positive (average) effect on the firms' business activities, the mere affiliation to a value chain is not sufficient for a company's success during the Great Recession. The specific modes of participation in the global production process strongly affects both the firms' performance, and propensity to engage in knowledge-creating strategies. Relational GVCs, comprising skilled firms with low degree of subordination, have a 4-to-6% higher probability of innovating and investing in R&D projects. On the other hand, different forms of value chains display no significant premium compared to domestic companies. This heterogeneity is also reflected in the dynamic of productivity and sales growth.
Due to data limitations we are not directly able to assess the effect of GVC participation on the firms' strategies in normal times, however the analysis of ex post performances provides some evidence on structural breaks induced by the Great Recession. A diff-in-diff exercise highlights a strong reduction in sales growth after 2008 (-9% in log-scale) while not detecting any sign of productivity drop within the same period. This combined evidence points at a severe demand shock hitting GVCs in times of crisis, and confirms previous arguments on the role of global networks in the transmission of international downturns. Importantly, we
show that the contraction was substantial for lowly-capable and subordinated suppliers, while relational GVCs were somewhat shielded from the effects of the crisis.
